African leaders are pledging thousands of new troops for Somalia to fight al-Qaida-linked militants responsible for the twin [sic] World Cup bombings that killed 76 people, and the U.S. says it will help bankroll the military campaign.
But internal documents obtained by The Associated Press show that that African Union forces and Somali troops don't trust one another, and that Somalia's government "lacks consistency, coherence and coordination," raising questions about whether more AU troops can solve the Somali impasse.
African leaders and U.S. officials called for stepped-up efforts in Somalia as an African Union summit here concluded Tuesday.
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At the summit, Africa's leaders voted to immediately dispatch 2,000 more Ugandan and Burundian troops to the African Union mission in Somalia, known as AMISOM, boosting levels from 6,000 to the maximum mandate of 8,000.
The AU has commitments of 4,000 troops — 2,000 from IGAD, a bloc of East African nations, and one battalion each from both Guinea and Djibouti, AU commission chairman Jean Ping said at the summit's closing news conference.
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America's top official for Africa, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Johnnie Carson, said that with a stronger AU force the African Union force could defeat al-Shabab...
"We believe that it is necessary to have more troops on the ground and we in Washington have committed ourselves to support additional troops on the ground in the same fashion that we have supported the existing Burundi and Ugandan troops," Carson said Monday.
Since 2007, the U.S. has given training, logistical support and equipment worth more than $176 million to AMISOM, and Carson has promised additional resources to Burundian and Ugandan troops without giving a precise figure.
But an internal report written last month by military experts from IGAD, the bloc of East African nations, cast doubt on the efforts being made by AMISOM troops. The report said there is a lack of trust between AU and Somali forces, and that the effectiveness of AMISOM troops is hindered by the Somali government's many weaknesses.
"The team found out that there is a misunderstanding and lack of trust between AMISOM and (Somali) security forces and this has caused poor coordination of tasks amongst them," said the report, which was obtained by the AP. The report also said the Somali government's approach to its duties "portrays a government with no clear vision."
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The internal IGAD report ... showed how far Somalia's forces have to go. The Somali troops do not have a physical headquarters. Equipment and weapons held by Somali forces, including ammunition, are not accounted for.
Somali "forces are not assigned barracks or camps and are staying wherever they can get accommodation," said the report, adding that there is "no formal and effective system of receiving and accounting for returning trainees from neighboring countries."
The East African: US Africa Command digs in, plans to give more aid to Amisom
..Africom is moving to expand its operations — not in the form of uniformed US troops, but through private contractors who will assist in efforts to safeguard American interests in Africa.
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Africom’s move to contract with private firms for counter-terrorism operations coincides with a $375 million State Department initiative involving use of US profit-making companies to train the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and other African countries.
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Private US military contractors have also worked with the Ugandan and Burundian troops assigned to the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom).
And Gen Ward indicated last week that Africom will be seeking ways to bolster Amisom’s capabilities in the wake of the recent terror bombings in Kampala carried out by Somalia’s Al Shabaab insurgents.
He ruled out direct US military involvement in Somala on the grounds that it would represent “an irritant and a distraction.”
Monday:
The East African:
“We know most countries just talk but do not commit. We are used to that. Once we get the right intelligence (on Al Shabaab), and the logistics and the mandate of the peacekeeping mission is reviewed, we shall go there alone. We are very ready,” said Okello Oryem, Uganda’s Minister for International Relations in an interview with The EastAfrican.
Since the Kampala bombing, President Yoweri Museveni’s administration has made it clear his government will fight Al Shabaab single-handedly at the invitation of Somalia’s governing Transitional Federal Government, should support from other African countries fail to materialise.
Kampala’s position seems to have already got the support of world powers like the United States and the United Kingdom. Somalia’s Defence Minister Abukar Abdi Osman hinted that the US was willing to help with the offensive although not directly. “They have promised logistics. We have been talking to them,” he said.
Tuesday:
Daily Monitor: Uganda ‘not happy’ with progress of Somalia talks
A Cabinet source said President Museveni was unhappy that the US, the most important funder of the peacekeeping effort in Somalia, had not “written a sizeable cheque” for the expanded operations anticipated.
“We are looking for more men and money. Unfortunately, while Washington has deep pockets, they are failing to commit in definite terms,” the source said.
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“The frustration right now is on financing,” said government spokesman Mr Fred Opolot. “Even if many countries have expressed condolences to Uganda [for the 7/11 attacks] they are not committing to do more”.
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In yesterday’s meeting, however, reliable sources said, they agreed only in principle to consider increased remuneration for AMISOM troops who are paid less than UN troops in Sudan’s troubled western region of Darfur (they get $500 per month as opposed to the $1,080 paid in Darfur).
New Vision
THE UN envoy on Somalia has said there is no need to change the mandate of the African Union (AU) forces in Somalia from peace-keeping to enforcement.
Augustine Mahiga made the remarks during a deliberation by African leaders on changing the mandate, following increased attacks on unarmed civilians and the AMISOM forces in Mogadishu.
BBC:
Rules of engagement are to be changed to allow the troops to fire first if they are facing imminent attack.
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni had wanted a tougher mandate to "eliminate" the al-Qaeda linked group that allowed forces to go on the offensive.
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The AU heads of state have chosen the somewhat safer middle ground; the peacekeepers can carry out pre-emptive attacks but there will be no change of mandate.
This decision is unlikely to make a significant difference on the ground but should help shore up the transitional government, especially if more equipment and troops arrive soon.
However the presence of more foreign troops in Somalia and the deaths of more civilians could well play right into the hands of al-Shabab.
New Vision:
In a related development, African Union and government troops launched an offensive against the Islamist rebels on Monday and repulsed them from two strategic locations.
Barigye said one of their soldiers was wounded in the latest clashes.
“One of our armoured vehicles was burned after it was hit, injuring the driver.
“But the government forces took control of the former interior ministry building area from the insurgents,” he told AFP.
At least 11 people, mainly militants, were killed in the fighting, officials said.
Reuters:
An African Union peacekeeping force in the capital, AMISOM, said it re-took a government building in the capital from the al Shabaab after heavy fighting, with casualties on both sides.
"Seven of our soldiers were killed by our own misdirected shell. As we advanced, I counted 18 dead bodies of al Shabaab" Mohamed Nur, a Somali military officer who fought alongside AMISOM troops told Reuters from the scene by phone.
Elman, a human rights group, said at least eight civilians were killed and 42 others were injured in the fighting.
A Somali voice, in the person of Former Somali Ambassador to the UN, Ahmed Abdi Hashi: An Open Letter to the AU Assembly of African Heads of State & Government
Will another foreign led military intervention bring durable peace to Somalia?
Lessons from history teach that surges in troop levels as well as military interventions in foreign lands, however robust, end in failure. Vietnam in the 1960s, Iraq and Afghanistan are such examples.
Closer to home, the US-UN led military intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s ended in failure. The more recent Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Somalia-2006-2008 resulted in the ignonamus defeat of the Ethiopian forces.
Foreign led military interventions do not bring durable peace to a country in a major conflict. On the contrary, killings, displacement of civilians and destruction become the order of the day.
At the same time, external actors like neighbouring countries pursue different national interests and strategic objectives, in most cases at variance with the quest for peace. Most of the IGAD member States are an example in this regard and in relation to Somalia.
EXCELLENCIES,
An expanded military intervention is the wrong prescription for Somalia. Like the previous attempts, this is bound to fail. Looking at Somalia only through the narrow prism of fighting terrorism will not promote peace in the country.
Likewise, imposing on the Somali people, a dysfunctional inept and famously corrupt TFG that controls few blocks in Mogadishu is a wrong track.
What is needed in Somalia is a political settlement of the conflict. And this can be done only by us Somalis. Any political settlement must premise on an all inclusive Somali owned peace process that must deliver durable peace.
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From the U.S. State Department's special briefing on Tuesday
Quote of the day, from Amb. Michael Battle, U.S. Ambassador to the AU
It is important to note that the U.S. Government spends more money on the African continent than any other nation in the world in our exceptional work that we do bilaterally and also in what we do multilaterally. Thank you.
Moving on to Johnnie Carson,
OPERATOR: This next question is from Sarah Childress of the Wall Street Journal. Your line is open.
QUESTION: Hi, I just wanted to ask in the conversations that you had at the summit with African Union or AMISOM officials, I wonder if you could talk about whether you discussed concerns that have emerged about civilian casualties caused by AMISOM fighting in Mogadishu. And can you talk about what came of those conversations? Is there kind of any other additional support, training, or assistance the U.S. might provide to help the AU minimize these casualties or any other action the U.S. might consider taking?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON: There was discussion about the issue of civilian casualties who were – who have been, unfortunately, caught up in the conflict there. I think that the UN – the new UN Special Representative for Somalia, Ambassador Mahiga, spoke to this point on several occasions and there was a discussion. No one – no one views this as something which is desirable or acceptable. No one looks at this as intentional or a matter of AMISOM policy. Everyone agrees that everything should be done to reduce the prospects and possibilities of civilian casualties. Everyone recognizes that these sorts of things sometimes happen in conflict.
I think there was indeed discussion about how to provide the AMISOM troops with better artillery and counter-battery measures in order to reduce any prospects and possibility. We all know that there can be civilian – unfortunate civilian casualties in conflict – again, no one thinks that this is intentional, desirable, or a matter of policy.
Of course these shellings are intentional - AMISOM forces participated alongside Ethiopian forces in the deliberate shelling of neighborhoods from Villa Somalia before Meles pulled his troops out and have continued those tactics ever since. It's well-reported that they tend to fire randomly at anything that moves whenever they come under fire. Recall the reports of civilians killed, often in passenger buses, in these episodes. They don't see themselves as having many options. They're not getting paid very much, if at all. Outside of their little enclave they are not popular in Somalia, which is well-known for being deeply hostile to armed occupiers (imagine that!), and they're outnumbered. An occasional misdirected shell taking out residents is one thing - a consistent pattern of such is quite another. Carson's talking point -- not intentional, not policy -- is simply spinning a press that is generally not well informed on Somalia outside of official channels. He is both enabling and acting as an apologist for war crimes, protecting the surrogate. (Which is nothing new for the position, as his predecessor encouraged such crimes and ensured impunity for them during Ethiopia's occupation from 2006 thru 2009.)
QUESTION: Hi. This is Dana Hughes from ABC News in Nairobi. And I was wondering, in the discussions with the African Union about civilian casualties, are there concerns with the AU deciding to strengthen the mandate and allow the troops to be more proactive in, I guess, what they’re saying is defending themselves?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON: I think that we had a very good discussion about the issue of civilian casualties. It is not a matter of policy, not a matter of intention. I think that some of the tactics employed by Al-Shabaab are responsible for some of the civilian casualties that have been reported in the press. Al-Shabaab moves in and out of market areas, in and out of civilian residential areas with the clear intent of using those markets and those residential units where civilians reside as a place where they can launch their mortars and fire their weapons.
The AMISOM troops are aware of this. They are exercising precautions not to indiscriminately fire into markets and civilian areas, particularly residential areas. There is a recognition on the part of AMISOM that it needs to improve the accuracy of its counter batteries, which can be done with improved technology, and that they also need to improve the level of their intelligence collection so that they are able to act preemptively to prevent attacks or to be able to interdict those individuals who are attacking them after they have removed themselves from more populated civilian areas.
There is absolutely no question that AMISOM recognizes the dangers inherent in firing into civilian areas. It not only creates casualties, but it turns the population against them. This is, again, not a matter of policy, not a matter of intent, and AMISOM is doing everything that it possibly can to reduce civilian casualties and to be careful and – in the way that it operates on the ground.
This is urban warfare and AMISOM is taking on more than just H.S.M. fighters here. It's not as if the militias enganged in attacks on TFG positions all come from other parts of the country - many are civilians from those very areas being targeted. It's disingenuous to claim that the problem is H.S.M., or H.I., or whomever, moving in and out of heavily populated areas for cover. Anyone w/ a passing understanding of guerilla warfare should be able to see through those statements. AMISOM is trying to, as the psychos in the biz like to say, 'drain the swamps.' Trying to use deadly force to terrorize people into dropping their resistance. Attrition. Make the costs too high. Clear the 'hoods.
AMBASSADOR BATTLE: One of the reasons that AMISOM has sought to move more aggressively is to make sure that it has the capacity to push Al-Shabaab further and further away from the center of the city. As Secretary Carson has indicated, one of the reasons that there have been instances of civilian casualties had to do with and continues to have to do with the tactics that are employed by Al-Shabaab in very close quartered, close proximity fighting. And by AMISOM being able to increase its numbers and to push Al-Shabaab further and further away from highly populated centers, that also will reduce, along with the technological counterbalances, the number of civilian casualties. The discussions about civilian casualties not only was a focus here, but has been a focus back at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa as well. There is a very, very high level of consciousness about trying to make sure that collateral damage is significantly reduced. And part of the acceleration of a number of forces will be to achieve the kind of margin and distance between the fighting forces that we will reduce significantly those collateral damages.
True to his name, I see. They'll not get enough troops to be able to do that, and the extra troops they do add, especially w/ the lead assistance from the U.S. (logistics, financing, arms), will only increase, and thus strengthen, resistance to it.
Not until the very end does Carson give an inkling of what the real U.S. fear is wrt Somalia, which is why the ICU's revolution was crushed so violently
It is important that the TFG be strengthened, for if it is not, Shabaab will continue to emerge as a significant political threat not only in the south, but also throughout the region.
They're not really worried about 'violent extremists'-- after all, what's more extreme than intentionally dropping bombs from remote control onto human beings as a matter of policy -- they're worried about popular control of political & economic power & authority, as are the regional dictators who understand the role model this would function as.
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Daily Monitor: United Nations blocks change of Amisom mandate
The African Union summit yesterday bowed to pressure from the United Nations and turned down a request that it support a change in the mandate of its peacekeeping mission in war-torn Somalia.
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Quoting Mr Mahiga, Mr Carson told a press conference in Kampala that Chapter 7 of the UN Charter gives the 6,300 Amisom force in Mogadishu “precisely what they need to undertake the kinds of operations that are required”
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Yesterday, the Chairman of the AU Commission, Mr Jean Ping said: “We had a request to change the mandate, which is under consideration. But there are implications. If we change the mandate, we need more equipment ...”
Mr Ping told journalists at the closure of the Summit that discussions with the USA, UK and France on reinforcing AMISOM with five helicopters were promising. He said the AU would also increase the soldiers pay from the current $500 dollars $750 dollars.
New Vision: Museveni has not become a dictator — Carson
THE US assistant secretary of state for Africa, Johnny Carson, has said President Yoweri Museveni has not turned into a dictator as he had predicted five years ago.
In an article published in The Boston Globe in May 2005, Carson said “Africa’s success story” (Uganda) could return to the dictatorial past if Museveni continued his controversial push for the removal of presidential term limits from the Constitution.
Asked yesterday whether he still held the same view five years later, Carson said: “I don’t believe [there's that phrase again - AC] President Museveni is a dictator. He is a president duly elected in a free and fair election.”
He added that the US wanted continued strengthening of democratic institutions in Uganda, just like in the rest of Africa.
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“We hope that the election next year will go well,” he said.
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Carson, who has been in the country for the last three days, attending the African Union Summit at Speke Resort Munyonyo, said they had agreed to boost the AMISOM forces and get them enough resources and equipment to fight the militants in Somalia.
He said three nations in west Africa and one from southern Africa had committed themselves to joining AMISOM. He did not name them nor the number of troops that they would contribute.
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Carson urged the international community not to look at the crisis in Somalia as “a US project” but an international problem.
Gettlemen surprises again, going contrary to the official U.S. line.
NYT: More Troops for Somalia, but No Peace to Keep
If there is one place on the African continent that could benefit from new thinking, it is Somalia, a country that has been mired in mutating forms of civil war for nearly 20 years.
But that is apparently not, many analysts contend, what Africa’s leaders are prepared to give it.
Instead, the various presidents across the continent said goodbye to one another on Tuesday at the close of their annual summit meeting by agreeing on a remedy that has never solved Somalia’s problems: more peacekeepers.
The approach goes against the grain of what recent history has taught about Somalia, analysts point out — that no amount of outside firepower has brought the country to heel.
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Many, if not most, of the analysts who follow Somalia believe that the African peacekeeping mission, no matter how many troops are part of it, is going to fail.
“I cannot think of a worse decision than to not merely continue the strategically bankrupt policy of sending more ‘peacekeepers’ to Somalia, when there is no peace for them to keep, but to compound that mistake by sending more troops to protect a regime that has no hope of ever governing southern and central Somalia, much less the entire country,” said J. Peter Pham, a senior vice president at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy.
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The African Union wants to add 2,000 troops now; some African leaders have even mused about another 14,000. The American government is also supportive of adding troops, offering in the past week to increase the peacekeeping money it contributes. (The United States has already provided close to $200 million.)
The philosophy is that if the peacekeepers can push the Shabab out of Mogadishu and buy a little time and space for the Somali government, the government can sprout roots, help the population with food, water, education and jobs, gain some credibility, and begin to turn around a country that has become a byword for anarchy.
Johnnie Carson, an assistant secretary of state and the top American diplomat for Africa, said Tuesday in Kampala that this outside intervention would be different from previous attempts, which were plagued by a “lack of consistency” and “a lack of resolution.”
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But many analysts argue that it would be better, in the long run, to pull out all the peacekeepers, let the transitional government fall, let the Shabab take over the country, and then allow clan militias and businessmen to rise up and overthrow them. The eventual result, analysts argue, would be a government that would be more organic and therefore more durable than a government that relies on outside forces to survive.
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Recent history has shown that nothing galvanizes Somalis more than an outside occupier.
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Garowe Online: 21 people killed in fresh Mogadishu fighting
At least 21 people have been killed and 45 others injured in gun battle and mortars exchanged by Somali government troops backed by AMISOM and Al-Shabaab extremist militias since Tuesday, Radio Garowe reports.
The clashes broke out at Hodan district of Mogadishu and mortars were later landed in Bakaro Market and Hawlwadaag in the war-scared capital of Somalia.
"Most of the mortars hit Bakaro Market, Hodan and Howlwadaag districts and left dozens dead and others injured” witnesses told Garowe Online.
Reuters:
"At least 918 civilians died and 2,555 others were injured in violence since January," Ali Yasin Gedi, the vice chairman of Elman rights group told Reuters.
"The death toll of the first seven months of 2010 is higher than that of the same period of 2009. Most of the casualties were caused by shelling by the warring groups in Mogadishu."
At least 745 people died and 3,435 others were injured in the same period last year.
Direct fighting between moderate Islamists of Ahlu Sunna and al Shabaab, combined with inter-clan clashes in central Somalia, also contributed to the higher number of deaths this year, Gedi added.
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Shabelle Media: Military movement continues in Hiran region, people start displacing from houses
Military movements between the transitional government of Somalia and Harakat Al-Shabab Mujahideen are continuing in parts of Beledweyn town of Hiran region in central Somalia as the people started displacing from their houses in the town on Thursday morning.
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Reports form Beledweyn town say that more government soldiers from Fer-fer and Mustahil villages in the Somali region in Ethiopian had continued making military movement and most of the residents in areas could be seen displacing for fears of fighting between Harakat Al-shabab Mujahideen and Government troops.
Ahmed Osman Inji, the commander of the transitional government troops for Hiran region said in an interview with Shabelle radio that they had concluded their military amass that they would take over the control of the region and there is no comment from the side of Al-shabab administration in the region so far.
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What to think of the following?
Uganda Record: No evidence of Al-Shabab role in Kampala bombings --- FBI
The ongoing FBI investigation into the July 11, 2010 bomb blasts in the Ugandan capital Kampala on the night of the football World Cup final continue to cast doubt on the initial belief that the Somali militants Al-Shabab carried out the attacks.
The Uganda Record had reported two days ago, July 26, 2010 that sources close to the Uganda Police investigators said they had failed to find any trace of evidence that links Al-Shabab to the bombings.
Yesterday, Tuesday July 27, the Uganda Record got further information, this time from a police source who has been working with the FBI on the investigation team. This source says the FBI has arrived at the same conclusion that this was not an attack masterminded by Al-Shabab, even though Al-Shabab belatedly laid claim to the attacks on Monday afternoon, July 12.
Last Friday, July 23, the larger part of the FBI agents known as the Scene of Crime Officers (S.O.C) flew out of Uganda having completed their basic forensic findings.
A smaller group of FBI analysts has remained behind for a further period of time whose work it will be to produce a report out of the material gathered by the SO.C. agents.
A source spotted the FBI analysts having a drink at the Pap Cafe along Parliament Avenue in Kampala yesterday.
Police sources say the FBI has now started to look into Al-Qaeda instead. Echoing this shift from Al-Shabab, the Red Pepper tabloid newspaper, which had good sources in Ugandan intelligence, since last week suddenly also started reporting on Al-Qaeda rather than Al-Shabab.
Pursuing the Al-Qaeda angle will be problematic. After all, the basis of firmly pinning the blame for the attacks on Al-Shabab had been a claim by Al-Shabab that it carried them out.
The Uganda Record argued in an editorial that a claim of responsibility from a guerrilla group, by itself, did not constitute proof since there is a propaganda value in taking credit for spectacular attacks.
Al-Qaeda has said nothing at all about the bomb blasts. It will be difficult to force evidence of Al-Qaeda, having first been sure it was Al-Shabab and the FBI's own findings now ruling that out.
The Ugandan rebel group the ADF that is allegedly affiliated with Al-Shabab has not claimed any part in the bombings, something it should and could have done to back up the claims of its supposed partner-in-crime Al-Shabab.
As most of the world's news media and political leaders laid the blame on Al-Shabab the day after the blasts, the Uganda Record stated and has stood by its belief from the start that this was definitely not Al-Shabab.
The FBI would do well to re-visit the memo to it by the Uganda Record pointing in the direction of the Ugandan state itself.
Given their track record, it would be an anomaly for H.S.M. to openly claim an attack it was not responsible for. Are their sources to be believed in claiming the finding's report does not support the H.S.M. claim?
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Michael Weinstein's latest analysis is up at Garowe Online and recounts The Power Struggle at the A.U. Summit.
From his wrapup
The power struggle between the I.G.A.D. states and the donor coalition led by Washington placed the A.U. in a compromised position. The majority of member states in an African region were calling for help in their efforts to contain H.S.M., yet the donor coalition did not want escalation of the military conflict in Somalia, because it might backfire into an H.S.M. “recruitment boom,” would eliminate the possibility of splitting H.S.M., and would cost money that might not gain any return.
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Since the donors had long been in favor of an increase in AMISOM force levels, they were willing to uncap the 8100 limit. How high it will go will depend upon what the donors are willing to pay.
Everything else that was requested by I.G.A.D. – mandate expansion, intervention by border states, and embargoes at H.S.M.-controlled airports and seaports – would amount to escalation of the conflicts in Somalia, which the donors did not desire. At the end, push came to shove on the question of “[adjustment in the rules of engagement].” The donor coalition accepted Muhiga’s formula of a “more responsible and robust” interpretation of the existing mandate to acknowledge the right of AMISOM to respond pre-emptively to direct threats on its positions; that is, a doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense that, as mentioned above, AMISOM has consistently held.
Donor acknowledgment of pre-emptive self-defense is the loose end left from the A.U. summit. It is (intentionally?) vague and ambiguous, allowing for everything from a broad interpretation that would sanction any aggressive action under the pretext of self-defense to a narrow construction that would only sanction pre-emption of an immediate threat. A repeat of the power struggle at the mini-summit might take place over pre-emptive self-defense, but it is likely that the donor powers would prevail; they hold the purse strings, and things will remain the same as they have unless the donor powers decide that a more “robust” approach is warranted. The remarks of the [Uganda] Eye’s sources and Ba-Hoku’s statements to the Voice of America indicate that AMISOM believes that its posture will remain defensive.
AMISOM does get more forces, which will either give it more protection and, perhaps, allow it to expand its perimeter around T.F.G. installations; or awaken resentment of the mission among Somalis and consequently increase support for H.S.M. Should AMISOM move too aggressively in pre-emptive self-defense and harm civilians, it will have eroded its position to a point that it would approach being untenable. Pre-emptive self-defense, in short, is hedged on every side.
H.S.M., which set off the rift in its opposition and the resulting power struggle among the latter, made good on its calculated risk in executing the World Cup bombings. H.S.M. made plain the lack of donor resolve, showed that the donors would not honor African interests, and created resentment, all of which tend to erode support for AMISOM in Africa. I.G.A.D. wanted to ride the wave of sympathy, panic, and anger following the Kampala bombings to a game-shifting change in Somalia; it found out that what plays in Kampala leaves the donors unmoved. On July 26, speaking for H.S.M., Sh. Mohamed Ibrahim Bilal commented that AMISOM was “an American project implemented through the A.U.” Above all, the summit showed that the A.U. was powerless to act on Somalia as an agent.
It is always possible that the donors will re-calculate their interests and allow a war to be fought against H.S.M. with their support. At present, there is no indication that they are moved to do so.
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From Wednesday's DOS daily press briefing
[Yesterday] you asked about direct assistance to the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia. Since 2007, the United States has obligated a total of $27.73 million to support the TFG’s security-related needs, mostly for in-kind equipment and training.
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Unofficial transcript from Carson's press conference on Tuesday posted by the
Daily Monitor under the headline Why US funds the war in Somalia
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This defection was noted back in mid-June but now there is a figure for the number of troops who switched.
Deutsch Welle: Hundreds of German-financed Somalia police officers go missing
Almost 1,000 Somali police have gone missing after their training was financed by the German government. It is feared these officers will now join forces with the Islamist militants Al-Shabaab.
In September 2009, the German government released $1 million (760,000 euros) of funding to train Somali police officers. The training took place in Ethiopia, and the new recruits were equipped with uniforms, weapons and knowledge with the aim of sending them back into Somalia to try and keep peace in the fractured country.
Two months after the completion of this training, almost 1,000 new police officers have reportedly disappeared en route to the Somali capital Mogadishu. It is thought highly likely that these deserters have left to join opposition Islamist militia in Somalia.
In a statement, the German Foreign Office confirmed that funds were released to train Somali police, and that in May 2010, 925 trained officers were transported to Somalia under Ethiopian surveillance. They did not comment on whether the police had deserted or not.
As a couple of the comments in that link point out, getting free training and a gun makes one more marketable back in Mogadishu.
And, in a separate matter, two items from an official letter from Germany's Foreign Office that was relayed to Garowe Online
The selection of recruits for the official armed forces of Somalia, who will be trained by the EU Training Mission for Somalia (EUTM), is the responsibility of the transitional government with the support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the United States of America.
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..on 10 and 12 June 2010, violent conflicts erupted in the Ugandan section of the Bihanga training camp between Somali recruits and their Ugandan instructors with several people injured on both sides.
The Somali recruits gave the harshness of the Ugandan basic training program as the reason for the conflict. This part of the training scheme is the exclusive responsibility of Uganda and is not part of the EUTM Somalia. This is why no EUTM trainers were present. Despite this fact, the head of the EUTM broached the subject with the Ugandan side and demanded that the conditions of the training scheme be improved. The Ugandan side agreed to do so.
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From an editorial in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette: Quelling Somalia: African nations favor a solution that hasn't worked
Americans could view the results of the summit with interest but no concern, except that the U.S. delegation, headed by Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. and representatives of the U.S. Africa Command and Department of State, pledged additional financing for the futile African peacekeeping mission, on top of the $200 million America has already given.
It is reasonable to ask why Mr. Holder was there, as opposed to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton or Defense Secretary Robert Gates. It is also reasonable to ask why, in this time of financial belt-tightening in the face of spiralling national debt and a very serious budget deficit, the United States is continuing to pay for an approach to a problem that has showed itself to be unsuccessful for 18 years.
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From a commentary at WDN: Somalia is a Victim of “False Flag Operations”
The infiltration of Americans and Europeans into the Islamic Courts Union (ICU); the breakdown of ICU into warring factions (Al-shabab, Hisbul Islam); Al-shabab’s extremely radical doctrine which contravenes some fundamental Islamic tenets. All these issues raise questions about how safe these religious groups are from being indirectly controlled by enemies. If the Red Brigades were infiltrated, it is plausible that among Al-shabab leaders are informants.
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SMC: Talk between Al-Shabab and Hizbul-Islam ends in vain
The talk between the two Islamist factions was mainly based to combine strength to fight against the Somali transitional federal government troops and the Afdrican Union troops on the ground.
An exclusive report which Somaliweyn website has receive from Hizbul-Islam officials who have declined their names to be quoted says that the recent talks between them and Al-Shabab has ended up without success.
“The talks between the us and Al-Shabab has ended up in vain and one of the major factors that have caused the dialogue to collapse is that Al-Shabab has suggested that we should work under their name and don’t want to hear Hizbul-Islam anymore, so this became indigestible point for us” said the officers of Hizbul-Islam who have declined their names to be quoted.
Each side has sent 5 of its members to represent the faction and the two figures of each of the faction who worth their names to be mentioned are Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Abu-Mansoor who was the first speaker of Al-Shabab and currently a big officer in the chain of command of Al-Shabab and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys the leader of Hizbul-Islam.
One of the most sensitive article which has made the two Islamist factions to immediately conclude their dialogue was that Al-Shabab has urged Hizbul-Islam should work under the name Al-Shabab and no more Hizbul-Islam what so ever the circumstance.
Before the dialogue between the two factions became abortive Hizbul-Islam was intending to join Al-Shabab, and willing to get equal power sharing, but Al-Shabab has thought twice about the issue of equal power sharing with Hizbul Islam, and their last outcome result was not to accept equal power sharing with Hizbul-Islam in Al-Shabab net work.
Despite the differences of the dialogue between Al-Shabab and Hizbul-Islam there is a plan of another dialogue between the two factions, although there is no specific date, time and venue announced.
It was less than a week, when the leader of Hizbul-Islam Sheikh Hassn dahir Aweys has told the press that the dialogue between his party and that of Al-Shabab is moving in a very understandable atmosphere, which can form a strong Islamist faction.
Like Al-Shabab Hizbul-Islam was in control of several districts in several regions in southern Somalia, but most of Hizbul-Islam administrations in some districts such as Luuq district in Gedo region, Baladweyn in Hiiran region Wanlaweyn in the lower Shabelle region have all surrendered themselves to Al-Shabab.
Shabelle Media: Talks between two anti-government Somali Islamists fail
A secret information obtained by Shabeelle Media Network indicate that the Al-Shabab Mujahidin Movement and Hisb al-Islam have disagreed in their talks that were held in Mogadishu for the last few days.
As confirmed to Shabeelle by Hisb al-Islam official who sought anonymity, the failed talks were held between officials from Al-Shabab Mujahidin Movement and Hisb al-Islam and were held in Mogadishu neighbourhoods.
Each group was represented by five of its officials. The delegations of the two groups were led by Shaykh Mukhtar Abu Mansur Robow who is one of the officials of Al-Shabab and Shaykh Hasan Dahir Aweys who is the leader of Hisb-al-Islam. The two groups disagreed on the issue of uniting under the name of Al-Shabab Mujahidin Movement.
Before the talks failed, Hisb al-Islam officials initially agreed to join Al-Shabab with all their weapons as happened in some other regions in southern Somalia. Hisb al-Islam officials then tabled power sharing proposal which was strongly opposed by Al-Shabab officials who see themselves stronger economically and militarily.
Though the talks failed, the two groups are to meet again over the same issue. The venue of the meeting and those who will attend it were not disclosed. Supporters of the two groups are no happy with the fact that talks between the two groups that was going on in Mogadishu were not successful.
Update: That story is being denied by H.S.M. and H.I. officials on Monday
Shabelle Media: Al-shabab, Hizbul Islam disprove negotiations failed
Officials of Harakat Al-shabab Mujahideen and Hizbu Islam have Monday held press conference in Mogadishu and disproved reports saying that the negotiations between the two sides failed.
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Dr. Hassan Mahdi, One of the officers of Hizbul Islam and Sheik Moktar Robow Ali (Abu Mansour), high official of Harakat Al-shabab Mujahideen had unanimously held press conference in the Somali capital Mogadishu and disproved that the negotiations of the two sides had failed.
Hassan Mahdi has said firstly in the press conference that a report released by Shabelle radio that was the talks between the two sides failed, was false asserting that the talks between Harakat Al-shabab Mujahideen and Hizbul Islam still continued yet, but not failed.
He said that their talks were yet continuing and would display the results for the people for the coming days adding that the people would hear what he did not mention, but asserted would be admired.
“We are confirming that the conference was not failed and the report of Shabelle was false. Hassan Dahir was not leading a conference and there was no conference at Torotow village in Lower Shabelle region. We held this conference to confirm the people that the report from Shabelle was baseless,” said Sheik Hassan Mahdi
During the conference, Sheik Moktar Robow (Abu Mansour), the former spokesman of Harakat Al-shabab Mujahideen said that the talks uniting Hizbul Islam and Harakat Al-shabab Mujhideen were not failed yet.
Abu Mansour said that the secret reports that Shabelle obtained and saying that the talks ended with out fruits were propaganda adding that the people would hear what they be glad soon.
“The statement that those said was false. It was not clear that the talks failed. We expect good results from the talks If Allah says. We congratulate for the people to be glad for following Ramadan month,” said Abu Mansour
Bloomberg adds
“There have been meetings for the past eight days to amalgamate the two sides’ holy mujahedeen brothers into one gigantic powerful unit,” Sheikh Hassan Mahdi, an official from Hisbul Islam, told reporters today in Mogadishu.
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Shabelle reported yesterday that a “great dispute” had derailed talks between al-Shabaab and Hisbul had failed.
The report is “null and void,” Sheikh Muktar Robow Ali Abu Mansor, a spokesman for al-Shabaab, told reporters at the media briefing today.
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