Jeremy Scahill follows up w/ another commendable report following his June trip to Somalia, giving a level of contextual coverage to Somalia's recent history that shames other western journalists. Obviously read the entire piece, but here are some highlights that deserve repeating.
As the “global war on terror” kicked off, the United States established a Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa. In 2002 some 900 military and intelligence personnel were deployed to the former French military outpost, Camp Lemonier, in the African nation of Djibouti. The secretive base would soon serve as a command center for covert US action in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, and as the launch pad for operations by the CIA and the elite Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to strike Al Qaeda targets outside the declared battlefield of Afghanistan, as part of the Bush administration’s borderless war strategy.
While there were rumblings early on that the United States intended to hit in Somalia, seasoned US experts on the region spoke out against it. “There’s no need to be rushing into Somalia,” former US ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn said. “If you think about military targets, I doubt they exist.” Ken Menkhaus, a Somalia scholar at Davidson College and a former political adviser to the United Nations in Somalia, has written several papers on the absence of a radical political Islamic tradition in Somalia. In early 2002 he estimated the number of Somali nationals with “significant links” to Al Qaeda at ten to twelve people, along with a few foreign fighters. Because of a dearth of intelligence—Shinn referred to it as “abysmal”—“snatch and grab”–type tactics were ill advised at the time.
The United States did not directly conduct such operations, but it initiated a proxy war that relied heavily on those very tactics. Rather than working with the Somali government to address what Somalia experts considered a relatively minor threat, the United States turned to warlords like Qanyare, and went down a path that would lead to an almost unthinkable rise in the influence and power of Al Qaeda and the Shabab.
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At the time, Qanyare was known as a secular warlord who commanded a militia of about 1,500 men. More important, he had his own airport outside Mogadishu. “The airport is inland, inside the bush. So the airport itself is very secretive,” he boasts. “We designed it not to expose or to see easily who is landing.” The Americans, he says, “enjoy that.” On January 5, 2003, a small group of US agents flew into Qanyare’s airfield, where he greeted them and took them to one of his homes. The men, he says, were “special military intelligence and CIA.” That meeting kicked off a three-year relationship between Qanyare and US intelligence agents.
Qanyare says agents would fly in to see him at least once or twice a week. The CIA, he says, began paying him in the ballpark of $100,000 to $150,000 a month to use his airport. At times, he would take agents around Mogadishu, pointing out various headquarters or houses he said were occupied by Al Qaeda figures. Qanyare soon became Washington’s man in Mogadishu.
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Believing they had the backing of Washington, Qanyare and other secular warlords began hunting down people the United States had identified, as well as those the warlords deemed worthy of Washington’s attention. Although there was certainly a small Al Qaeda presence in Somalia before the United States launched its operations—and Islamic militants did carry out assassinations, including the killing of four foreign aid workers in the relatively peaceful Somaliland region in late 2003 and early 2004—the actions of Qanyare and his fellow CIA-backed warlords gave the Islamic militants fodder for an effective propaganda and recruitment campaign.
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Qanyare and his allied warlords engaged in a targeted kill-and-capture campaign against individuals they suspected of supporting Islamic radicals. “These people were already heinous warlords; they were widely reviled in Mogadishu. And then they start assassinating imams and local prayer leaders who had nothing to do with terror,” says Abdirahman “Aynte” Ali, a Somali analyst who has written extensively on the history of the Shabab and warlord politics. “They were either capturing them and then renditioning them to Djibouti, where there is a major American base, or in many cases they were chopping their head off and taking the head to the Americans or whoever. And telling them, ‘We killed this guy.’”
In a handful of cases, the warlords caught someone the United States considered to be of value, like Suleiman Ahmed Hemed Salim, captured in March 2003. One of Qanyare’s fellow warlords, Mohamed Dheere, seized Salim and rendered him into US custody. Salim was reportedly later held in two secret prisons in Afghanistan. Scores of other “suspects” were abducted by the CIA-backed warlords and handed over to American agents. In many cases, the United States would determine they had no intelligence value and repatriate them to Somalia. Sometimes, according to several former senior Somali government and military officials, they would be executed by the warlords so that they could not speak of what had happened to them.
The “US government was not helping the [Somali] government but was helping the warlords that were against the government,” Buubaa, the former foreign minister, tells me. Washington “thought that the warlords were strong enough to chase away the Islamists or get rid of them. But it did completely the opposite. Completely the opposite.”
That history is looking to repeat itself too... Jumping ahead a little in the article,
“The dual track policy only provides a new label for the old (and failed) Bush Administration’s approach,” observed Somalia analyst Afyare Abdi Elmi. “It inadvertently strengthens clan divisions, undermines inclusive and democratic trends and most importantly, creates a conducive environment for the return of the organized chaos or warlordism in the country.”
The dual-track policy encouraged self-declared, clan-based regional administrations to seek recognition and support from the United States. “Local administrations are popping up every week,” says Aynte. “Most of them don’t control anywhere, but people are announcing local governments in the hopes that CIA will set up a little outpost in their small village.”
Returning to the chronological thrust of Scahill's report,
by most credible accounts, the Al Qaeda influence at the time was small—consisting of about a dozen foreign operatives and a handful of Somalis with global jihadist aspirations. A UN cable from June 2006, containing notes of a meeting with senior State Department and US military officials from the Horn of Africa task force, indicates that the United States was aware of the ICU’s diversity, but would “not allow” it to rule Somalia. The United States, according to the notes, intended to “rally with Ethiopia if the ‘Jihadist’ took over.” The cable concluded, “Any Ethiopian action in Somalia would have Washington’s blessing.” Some within the US intelligence community called for dialogue or reconciliation, but their voices were drowned out by hawks determined to overthrow the ICU.
The United States “had already misread the events by aiding heinous warlords. And they misread it again. They should have taken this as an opportunity to engage the Union of Islamic Courts,” asserts Aynte. “Because out of the thirteen organizations that formed the [ICU], twelve were Islamic courts, clan courts who had no global jihad or anything. Most of them never left Somalia. These were local guys. Al Shabab was the only threat, that was it. And they could have been somehow controlled.”
The Islamic Courts Union lasted just six months. In December 2006, after a visit to the region by Gen. John Abizaid, then head of the US Central Command (Centcom), the United States gave the green light for Ethiopia—a nation widely reviled in Somalia—to invade. On the eve of the invasion, Indha Adde held a news conference calling for foreign Islamists to come and join the cause. “Let them fight in Somalia and wage jihad, and, God willing, attack Addis Ababa,” he said.
The Ethiopians invaded on December 24. It was a classic proxy war coordinated by Washington and staffed by 40,000–50,000 Ethiopian troops. “The US sponsored the Ethiopian invasion, paying for everything including the gas that it had to expend, to undertake this. And you also had US forces on the ground, US Special Operations forces. You had CIA on the ground. US airpower was a part of the story as well. All of which gave massive military superiority to the Ethiopians,” says Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, director of the Center for the Study of Terrorist Radicalization and a frequent adviser to the US military, including Centcom. “If there’s one lesson in terms of military operations of the past ten years, it’s that the US is a very effective insurgent force. In areas where it’s seeking to overthrow a government, it’s good at doing that. What it’s not shown any luck in doing is establishing a viable government structure.”
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“The end result of the US-backed Ethiopian invasion and occupation,” Buubaa, the former foreign minister, told me, was “driving Somalia into the Al Qaeda fold.”
When's the last time you saw that part of the story covered in the media? Never? I think you're correct...
Of Madobe's account of his encounter w/ US SOF, Schahill writes:
Since the early 1990s, the stretch of land just across the Somali border from Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp—the world’s largest, and the epicenter of the humanitarian crisis in the region today—has been the stronghold of the Ras Kamboni movement, currently led by Sheik Islam, also known as Madobe, or Black. Madobe was a longtime deputy of Hassan Turki, one of the founders of militant Islamic radicalism in Somalia and a US-designated terrorist. As the Ethiopians invaded, Madobe, like other ICU leaders, was forced to retreat from Mogadishu to his home base. But his name was already on a US list of targeted ICU leaders. On January 23, 2007, as US Special Operations forces began using a secret airbase in eastern Ethiopia to launch raids inside Somalia, Madobe became the hunted.
In June of this year, I snuck across the Kenyan-Somali border with two photojournalist colleagues to meet Madobe, who provided me with an extensive account of the elite Joint Special Operations Command’s attempt to assassinate him.
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“Every step taken by the US has benefited Al Shabab,” he told me. “What brought about the ICU? It was the US-backed warlords. If Ethiopia did not invade and the US did not carry out airstrikes, Al Shabab would not have survived so long, because they were outnumbered by those who had positive agendas.”
I asked him about the JSOC strike against him. He and eight of his people were on the run and were being surveilled regularly by US aircraft, he recalled. “Most of the time they were tracking us using unmanned drones. At night we were afraid of lighting a fire to cook, and in the daylight we did not want to create smoke and we had no precooked food, so it was really very tough. We also had Thuraya satellite phones, which clearly helped them easily trace us.”
On the night of January 23, Madobe and his small group set up camp under a large tree in rural southern Somalia. “At around 4 am we woke up to perform the dawn prayers, and that’s when the planes started to hit us. The entire airspace was full of planes. There was AC-130, helicopters and fighter jets. The sky was full of strikes. They were hitting us, pounding us with heavy weaponry.” The eight people with him, who Madobe said included men and women, were all killed.
Madobe was wounded. He believed that a ground force would come for him. “I picked a gun and a lot of magazines. I believed that death was in front of me, and I wanted to kill the first enemy I saw. But it did not happen.” Madobe lay there, losing blood and energy. At around 10 am, he said, US and Ethiopian forces landed by helicopter near his position. He recalled a US soldier approaching him as he lay shirtless on the ground. “Are you Ahmed Madobe?” the soldier asked. “Who are you?” he replied. “We are the people that are capturing you,” he recalled the soldier telling him.
They loaded Madobe onto a helicopter and took him to a makeshift base in Kismayo. The US forces, he said, immediately began interrogating him, and only after Ethiopian forces intervened did they give him water and medical treatment. In Kismayo, he was regularly interrogated by the Americans. “They had names of different rebels and fighters on a list, and they were asking me if I knew them or had information about them,” he said. A month later, on March 1, he was rendered to Ethiopia, where he was held for more than two years. For the first eight months in Addis Ababa, he was held in a hospital or in prison. While there, he said, he saw many ICU leaders and some of the foreign fighters who had come to Somalia to fight the Ethiopians. “While I was in jail in Addis Ababa, around fifty foreigners shared the jails with me,” he recalled.
Eventually, Madobe was placed under house arrest in a hotel. During his numerous “interviews” with US officials, as Madobe put it, they “sorted out differences.” It is clear that the Ethiopians, who had long funded various Somali warlords and other political figures, forged a new relationship with Madobe. “The view I had about Ethiopia greatly changed, as did the one I had about international policy on Somalia,” he told me. After reaching an agreement in 2009 with the Ethiopian and Somali governments, Madobe returned to his region.
As to Sheikh Sharif's "conversion" and installation, Scahill alludes to it but does not get enough material to come right out and say it:
Sheik Sharif, who was the commander in chief of the ICU, escaped to Kenya in early 2007 with the help of US intelligence. Gedi tells me, “I believe that [Sharif] was also working with the CIA. They protected him.” [former PM] Gedi says that when Sharif fled to Kenya, the US government asked him to issue Sharif documents allowing him to travel to Yemen. Gedi says he also wrote letters on Sharif’s behalf to the Kenyan and Yemeni governments asking that Sharif be permitted to relocate to Yemen. “I did that upon the request of the government of the US,” he recalls. The New York Times reported that US officials considered Sharif to be a “moderate Islamist.” In Yemen, Sharif began organizing his return to power in Mogadishu. In exile, he and other ICU leaders helped form the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). Sharif eventually ended up operating out of Djibouti, where the United States had a sizable CIA and Special Operations presence; another faction of the ARS, led by Aweys, based itself in Eritrea. While Aweys and his allies, including Indha Adde, vowed to continue the struggle against the Ethiopians and the Somali government, Sharif intensified his cooperation with the TFG and the US government.
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When I met Sharif at the presidential offices in Mogadishu, he refused to discuss this period of his career, saying only that it was not the right time.
One issue w/ Schahill's piece is conflating Aweys and H.S.M. too early. He writes,
In mid-2009, Indha Adde split with Aweys and then switched sides once again, serving as defense minister in Sheik Sharif’s government. Aweys began the formal process of merging with the Shabab. In May 2009 major fighting broke out between the former ICU allies, spurring the UN special envoy to Somalia to accuse Aweys of “an attempt to seize power by force—it’s a coup attempt.” The Shabab, once a ragtag militant group, had become a major force, one that would continue to benefit from a confused US policy that doubled down on past mistakes.
Hisbul Islam didn't formally come into existence until that time and was distinct from H.S.M. until late the following year. Aweys had reached out to the latter a number of times, when conditions permitted, but there was never a "formal process of merging with the Shabab" and Aweys was not responsible for H.S.M. actions until he was essentially forced to fold into the movement.
Also worth noting, caution should be preserved in accepting as truth or fact everything that comes out of the mouths of characters like Adde, Qanyare, Madobe, and Gedi, obviously, however the overall narrative recounted rings true and is somewhat of a far cry what get proffered day in and day out across the wire services or by journalists reporting from hotels in Nairobi or press junkets in AMISOM bunkers arranged w/ UN funds. Kudos to Schahill on this one. Just wish that more readers were hearing of this stuff five years ago.
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Garowe Online: National Consultative Conference opens in Mogadishu
The four discussion groups at the conference include: security, reconciliation, constitution and parliament reforms, and good governance, according to conference documents.
The conference consists of 100 delegates representing the TFG executive and parliamentary branches, Puntland state government, and local administrations of Galmudug and Ahlu Sunna militia.
Shabelle Media: Ahlu Sunna denies it takes part in Somalia’s consultative meeting
Somalia’s moderate Islamist group of Ahlu Sunna Waljama on Tuesday strongly denied that representatives from them are attending Somalia’s consultative meeting backed by UN and held in Mogadishu.
The chairman of Ahlu Sunna’s consultation committee in central Somalia regions Sheikh Omar Sheikh Abdulkadir Adam told the local press that there are no any members from the group present at the UN backed meeting which is going on in the capital.
He expressed pessimism about the future outcome of that meeting, adding that Somali people have no any interest in it.
For his part, the chairman of Ahlu Sunna’s executive committee Sheikh Mohamed Yusuf Hefow said that his group is not attending the meeting. He not[ed] that Ahlu Sunna has several administrations in south-central Somalia.
Despite those statements, members claiming to be Ahlu Sunna have attended the high level UN sponsored meeting to end the transitional period which Somalia has been undergoing for about seven years.
Xinhua: Hopes, doubts expressed about Somalia consultative meeting
As the United Nations (UN)- sponsored gathering of key Somali leaders enters its final day, people have expressed mixed feelings regarding the outcome of the meeting in the Somali capital.
The three-day meeting facilitated by the UN Political Office for Somalia is aimed at formulating a roadmap for the war-ravaged country to end the almost seven years of successive transitional administration that largely failed to accomplish key tasks required to lead to a permanent and stable government for Somalia.
The main tasks include the completion of the reconciliation process, and the establishment of a secure environment in the country to make it possible for the holding of free and fair elections. The national constitution should have been drafted during the long transitional period while good governance was supposed to be the bases for administering the affairs of government.
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..some have expressed doubts about the meeting and what it can achieve in the next 12 months that this government and previous ones failed to realize to take the country to a stable and permanent administration.
The Mogadishu meeting is attended by selected leaders from the Somali government and parliament while only two regional states were represented at the gathering. The main Ahlu Sunnah Waljama (ASWJ) which is also a key player in Somalia was only nominally represented as the top leaders stayed away from the meeting.
Mohamed Yusuf, an MP in the Somali parliament, is skeptical that the meeting will not be any different from previous failed gatherings of Somali politicians, saying the meeting is "no more than alliance forming than one to discuss substantive issues in the country."
"We are all interested in the country moving out of transitional period to permanency of stable government, but what is taking place will never illusion anybody as it sidelines key players that should have had their say in the future of this country," Yusuf said.
"Traditional elders who are the true leaders of this country were not invited, nor were Ahlu Sunnah nor anyone from the civil society were represented at that meeting which seems more an alliance forming than one to discuss the substantive issue in the future of this country," Yusuf added.
Community leaders as well as civil society groups said that as the meeting is supposed to charter the future direction of the country it should have been more inclusive and representative of the Somali people instead of having just key leaders of the country discussing on the future of the whole Somalia in three days.
"I don't know what is going to be had in three days that will enable the country to do in a year what it could not do in seven years without a much broader consultation than we are seeing now," a top leader in the Somali civil society said.
DOS press release: Statement by Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson
The United States welcomes the adoption by key Somali leaders of the Roadmap for Ending the Transition in Somalia. We thank the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, for facilitating this process. The Transitional Federal Government, the regional Administrations of Puntland and Galmuduug, and the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a movement completed an agreement on September 6 that addresses critical transitional requirements. We will closely monitor progress and hold Somali officials accountable for meeting these benchmarks and will continue our support for efforts to achieve the goals of the Roadmap and bring stability to Somalia.-- -- --
IRIN: Analysis: Mogadishu after Al-Shabab
fter the Al-Shabab insurgency announced on 6 August that it was pulling out of Mogadishu, the hope was that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) would fill the vacuum, but doubts are emerging about its capacity to stamp its authority on the capital.
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An aid worker, who requested anonymity, told IRIN that immediately after the insurgents pulled out, roadblocks emerged in parts of the city. "We saw roadblocks around Bakara market, Hawl-Wadag district and Boondheere."
He said there was also fear that warlords - who controlled parts of the city from the 1990s to 2006 - or people associated with them, were trying to take control of the areas formerly occupied by Al-Shabab.
He said most of the roadblocks were manned by militias under the control of district commissioners. "The government must unify control of the various armed groups under one command," he said. Otherwise, "we will have serious problems delivering aid to those most in need”.
"[H.S.M.] are definitely still in control of Huriwa and Suuqa Hoolaha [north of the city]," said a local journalist, adding that on 5 September, the group attacked units of government forces in the city. "They may have been weakened considerably but they are still here."
NYT: As an Enemy Retreats, Clans Carve Up Somalia
Adan Dahir Hassan sits in a bald office, wires dangling from the ceiling, handing out death sentences. Recently installed by an Islamist warlord, Mr. Hassan recalled how he had ordered a soldier who had killed a civilian, possibly by accident, to be delivered to the victim’s family, which promptly shot him in the head.
“It’s Islamic law,” said Mr. Hassan, the professed district commissioner of this bullet-riddled town. “That’s what makes the community feel happy.”
For the first time in years, the Shabab Islamist group that has long tormented Somalis is receding from several areas at once, including this one, handing the Transitional Federal Government an enormous opportunity to finally step outside the capital and begin uniting this fractious country after two decades of war.
Instead, a messy, violent, clannish scramble is emerging over who will take control.
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..the government is too weak, corrupt, divided and disorganized to mount a claim beyond Mogadishu, the capital, leaving clan warlords, Islamist militias and proxy forces armed by foreign governments to battle it out for the regions the Shabab are losing.
Already, clashes have erupted between the anti-Shabab forces fighting for the spoils, and roadblocks operated by clan militias have resurfaced on the streets of Mogadishu, even though the government says it is in control. Many analysts say both the Shabab and the government are splintering and predict that the warfare will only increase, complicating the response to Somalia’s widening famine.
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More than 20 separate new ministates, including one for a drought-stricken area incongruously named Greenland, have sprouted up across Somalia, some little more than Web sites or so-called briefcase governments, others heavily armed, all eager for international recognition and the money that may come with it.
Officials with the 9,000-strong African Union peacekeeping force, the backbone of security in Mogadishu, say they are deeply concerned by this fragmentation, reminiscent of Somalia’s warlord days after the government collapsed in 1991.
“What was holding everybody together is now gone,” lamented an African Union official, who asked not to be identified because he was departing from the official line that all is well in Mogadishu. “All these people who came together to fight the Shabab are now starting to fight each other. We weren’t prepared for this. It’s happening too fast.”
American officials are struggling to keep up with Somalia’s rapidly evolving — or some say devolving — politics, saying they have lost faith in the transitional government’s leaders and are now open to the idea of financing some local security forces, part of what they call a “dual track” approach to supporting the national and local governments at the same time.
“It wouldn’t be the worst thing in the world to have a local leader with some charisma and grass-roots support,” said one American official, who was not authorized to speak publicly.
Gettleman, at the outset of the article, projects the notion that this chaos was what the U.S. had wanted to avoid by supporting the TFG, however it was clear from the "dual track" announcement that a reversion to warlord rule was now being favored as a solution to eradicating any foothold of wider political Islam in Somalia. They just don't want to say it publicly. Even the former PM, Farmajo, envisioned "the warlords serving as territorial governors under a national government overseeing defense and education". It was a stupid move in 2006 and it's even more stupid now to attempt to repeat it.
Globe and Mail: Roadblocks, bullets and bloodshed undermine Somalia famine relief efforts
When the refugees swarmed the food truck and the bullets began flying, Duniyo Alosolow was in the middle of it, ducking for cover. “I saw people killed in front of my eyes,” she remembers.
“Anyone who is strong and had a gun took the food,” she said at the sprawling refugee camp in Mogadishu where she lives. “We aren’t strong, so we didn’t get the food.”
Up to 10 people were killed by government troops and private militiamen in the gunfight last month as the gunmen and the refugees looted the first delivery of United Nations food rations to famine victims at the Badbaado refugee camp.
Since then, the UN has not dared to distribute rations to the 30,000 people at the camp, leaving them dependent on a single daily meal from its kitchens. Hunger is rising, forcing many desperate refugees to walk for hours to other camps in search of food.
Yet hundreds of sacks of flour, donated by Arab countries, are stacked high in a metal shed at the camp. The refugees say they never receive flour – despite claims by camp officials that the food is regularly distributed. Theft and corruption is said to be rampant at the camp.
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“Compared to this, Haiti was a piece of cake,” says one veteran aid worker who has served both in Mogadishu and in Haiti’s earthquake disaster last year.
“In Haiti, you could move around,” he said. “Here you can’t get around, because you’re a target. Somalis don’t want to talk to you because they’re under constant threat. This is a crazy conflict zone, with all these players, all these guns, and you can’t keep track of them.”
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..with guns everywhere, the rebels are far from the only threat. Last week, a Malaysian television cameraman who was following an aid convoy was shot dead in the centre of Mogadishu by a soldier from the African Union peacekeeping force who mistakenly opened fire on the convoy. Local officials, including powerful warlords, are another threat. A few days ago, a gunfight erupted in the middle of the city in a dispute over an illegal checkpoint, set up by a private militia to raise money for the warlord who employs them.
Even one of the most courageous and independent of the relief agencies, Médecins sans frontières (Doctors Without Borders), does not allow its foreign staff to stay in a refugee camp for more than 30 minutes because of the danger that they could be detected by bandits or rebel infiltrators. Their movements around the city are kept unpredictable to prevent ambushes. Each of its local Somali teams is protected by armed guards whenever they work in the camps.
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Paradoxically, one of the biggest problems is the uncontrolled proliferation of aid donations in Mogadishu, led primarily by donors from Islamic nations who wanted to fulfill their religious charity obligations during the Islamic holy month, which just ended. Some wealthy Arab donors have shown up in Mogadishu with bags of cash to distribute. Others are buying most of their food in the Mogadishu markets – inadvertently driving up the price of food in the city, which hurts the Somali population.
“It’s a big problem because there is nobody to account for the aid,” says Jabril Ibrahim Abdulle, director of the Center for Research and Dialogue, a Somali think tank.
“Some refugee camps are overwhelmed with food, while others have hardly any. No co-ordination whatsoever is taking place.”
He worries that the influx of foreign food aid could expand the power of Mogadishu’s warlords, as it did in the last famine in 1992. “When a huge amount of food arrives without accountability, it creates warlords. It could be the legacy this time too.”
Shabelle Media: Armed men force 300 families to flee from IDPs camp in Mogadishu
Armed men dressed in Somali government military uniforms have forcedsome 300 famine displaced people to flee from IDPs camps in Mogadishu’s Hodan district.
Witnesses said the internationally displaced people at Tarbunka area in Mogadishu were bullied and intimidated by armed men.
The witnesses said the armed assailants also destroyed and tore down IDPs makeshift settlements and huts.
Shabelle Media: Somali soldier kills six civilians in Mogadishu shooting spree
A Somali government soldier on Wednesday murdered at least six famine displaced people in a shooting spree that took place in strife torn Mogadishu.
Eyewitnesses told Shabelle Radio that the incident occurred in Mogadishu’s Waberi district where food aid distributions were continuing. He said another internally displaced person was also injured in the shootout.
Witnesses added that the soldier was among government forces guarding the aid convoys and food distributions there.
However, what has impelled him to fire the famine hit people lining up to receive aid is still unknown.
According to the latest reports from the incident, Somali government forces captured the murderer and took into custody.
Garowe Online: 5 killed in Mogadishu bombing, soldier shoots famine victims
At least 5 people were killed Friday in Mogadishu, two days after 7 civilians were killed by Somali government soldiers opened fire at a food aid distribution center, Radio Garowe reports.
Friday’s deadly explosion occurred at Suk Ba’ad in north Mogadishu, with witnesses saying that at least to Somali soldiers were among the 5 dead victims.
“It was a big explosion…I saw 10 wounded persons,” said a witness who declined to say his name, adding that a “huge smoke” followed the bombing.
It was not clear what type of bombing it was. Some witnesses said the bomb was “left there” and exploded as civilians and soldiers “came over to look at the bomb.”
No group claimed responsibility for the bombing, but Suk Ba’ad, in Mogadishu’s Yaaqshid district, is among locations vacated by Al Shabaab militant group in August.
On Wednesday, a Somali soldier opened fire at a food aid distribution center in Mogadishu’s Waberi district, killing at least 7 civilians who were victims of famine.
TFG officials in Mogadishu said the soldier has been arrested. The timing of this deadly shooting comes at a time when TFG officials have publicly stated that the Somali interim government has established a “special force” to protect humanitarian aid in Mogadishu.
A Press TV report on the explosion in Yaaqshid does not mention any soldiers being killed:
At least twelve children have been killed and fifteen others wounded after a bomb they found in the war-ravaged Somali capital of Mogadishu exploded, Press TV reports.-- -- --
The children found the bomb at Suuq Baad market in Mogadishu's northern district of Yaqshid as they were searching for scrap metal in the area on Friday, according to the report.
Seven children died on the spot, while five others succumbed to their injuries in a local medical center.
The remaining 15 injured children are said to be in critical condition in a hospital.
After the invitation-only potemkin conference ends, the new PM throws out another tale,
Reuters: INTERVIEW-Negotiations with Somali rebels an option-PM
"We are open to dialogue with ... any organisation that's going to reach (out) to us, work with us to bring peace and stability to Somalia," Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali told Reuters.
"We don't have formal talks with (al Shabaab) but here and there we talk to them and maybe there is some willingness from some of them to lay down their arms and negotiate," Ali said in an interview.
It was too early, he said, to talk about conditions on negotiations or what incentives the government might offer the militants, whose bloody four-year insurgency has led to the deaths of tens of thousands of Somalis.
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"You don't talk to foot-soldiers, you negotiate with leaders. The incentive is deal with us first and we will talk later," said Ali, previously a professor of economics in the United States before he joined the U.N.-backed government.
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Ali spoke to Reuters in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, as regional heads of state gathered in the east African country for an emergency regional summit on the famine that the U.N. says is killing hundreds of Somalis daily.
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Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has said the region's IGAD bloc is ready to contribute to "cross-border operations" that "expand the zone of stability" to ensure food aid reached hungry Somalis in rebel controlled regions.
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The plan has raised concerns among aid groups that aid corridors could be a pretext for military intervention.
Ali said he was not aware of Meles' comments.
Neither is he apparently aware of what he tells others...
HOL:
Somali Prime Minister, Abdiwali Ali, declared that his government is open to have negotiations with the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, according to an interview with the BBC yesterday.-- -- --
The Prime Minister Ali set a precondition for the direct negotiations with the Shabaab, which is a total disarmament.
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..Mr. Ali indicated that “there are signs that show Al-shabaab’s interest for entering negotiations with the TFG and we look forward to that.”
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“If they take the disarmament option and embrace the peace, then we will accommodate for them a place in the government” said the Mr. Ali.
The Standard: Fighting erupts at the Kenya-Somalia border
There has been heavy fighting between Al-shabaab militia and Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government personnel near the Elwak Kenyan border in Mandera. Witnesses confirmed several casualties on both sides as the fighting to control the border town of Burahashe continued on Sunday.
At least 15 TFG soldiers are admitted at the Elwak Hospital in Kenya after being hit by the militia group. It is not yet clear how many are dead or injured from both sides as the fighting rages.
Shabelle Media: 14 killed as Al shabaab re-takes over southern Somalia town
The Al shabaab fighters on Sunday re-took over the town of Elwak in southern Somalia after bitter battle with Somali government forces in Gedo region.
Eyewitnesses told Shabelle Radio that the town fell into hands of Al shabaab after launching premeditated offensive on government forces there.
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The fighting on Sunday left at least 14 people dead while dozens more injured. Reports say that two parts captured battle wagons from each other.
Locals were affected by the battle and some of them started fleeing from their homes to save their lives from random bullets and mortars.
Mareeg Online: Al shabaab vacates southern Somalia town after taking over
Al shabaab fighters on Sunday afternoon vacated the town Elwak in southern Somalia region of Gedo hours after taking over.
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Source told mareeg that Al shabaab fighters, who early Sunday hours confiscated the control of Elwak town, have [pulled back] under counter attack.
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Mohamed Abdi Kalil, the governor of Gedo region for the transitional federal government said his forces are inside Elwak, adding that they inflicted irretrievable losses to the Al shabaab without giving further details.
The spokesman of Al shabaab group’s fighters Sheikh Abdi-Aziz Abu Musab said they attacked the town and killed 70 government soldiers and more military supplies.
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